100 years of the Communist Party of China: past, present and the future

 

The day of the 1st of July in China was celebrated with extreme grandeur, power projection and chutzpah, as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) celebrated 100 years of its foundation. When Mr Xi addressed the crowd of 70,000 people from the ramparts of Tiananmen square, a symbolic place, wearing a Mao suit, he projected the tenacity and hard work of the party in building the Chinese nation and concomitantly signalled the path that the Chinese nation will take in the times to come. A close look at the ceremony, portraying a veil of utopia, showed the progress that China has made since its independence in 1949 under the guidance of the CCP, particularly after its opening up to the world. One cannot help but wonder about the future of China amidst a hostile climate when domestic nationalism and the party's grip on the nation are culminating.

The party that has withstood the test of the times, fighting the disaster like a great leap forward and cultural revolution to defenestrating the socialist ideology in the economic sphere when it found its need, has become omnipresent today. As CCP celebrated its centenary, it has also become the longest-running state party. The party which was started by just 12 men in 1921 now stands with a huge strength of 95 million members, a century later. It has not only grown in strength but also in its capacity to deliver and act with sophistication. 

From Mao to Xi: the transformation of leadership and China

Mao was the driving force of the country in the initial years. His vision was to make China a socialist country that would be self-sufficient and isolated from the world. His foreign policy was short-sighted and his major vision was to command the domestic conditions of the country. The devils of 'Great Leap Forward' and 'Cultural Revolution' which killed millions of people in China still haunts the conscience of the leader of the CCP. By the time Mao left, China was the 'Sick man of Asia'.

After the death of Mao, China got a visionary leader Deng Xiaoping, whose idea was to develop China even if that warrants defenestration of the economic thinking of a Marxist-Leninist state. He was drawing lessons from the failed economy of the Soviet Union and understood well the importance of opening up and the power of Capitalism. China did open up, albeit in a hybrid sense whereby the party oversaw the development process and try to set up its domestic giants(State-owned enterprises). He also brought governance reforms by separating governance and party affairs, to make swift and effective implementation of the policies that were needed for double-digit growth. The subsequent years brought wealth and its attached powers to China. 

Deng Xiaoping's successors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao followed the footstep of Deng and try to open up China further. However, the party found out that it has been risking its political-ideological belief and supremacy by opening up and developing China with liberal economic policies and decentralization of power with collective leadership, an idea opined by Deng Xiaoping, which made China the centre of the Asian century. The first breakthrough came in the aftermath of the Tiananmen incident when Deng and Party elders resolved to close down space for political reform although pursuing the economic reforms. The tides turned in the backdrop of the 2008 Beijing Olympic games, during Hu's era, as the trade-offs and ripple effects of liberal principles in the economic domain became palpable on the political domain. Under Xi, China has become more assertive over its political reforms and economic policies.

Xi was the man who came at the helm to salvage the morally decaying Chinese society and the Party. His emphasis on curbing the 'corruption and bureaucratism' was something that made him a popular leader. Now here was the man, a messiah may be, who was ready to take the bull by its horns and become the guiding force of the party as well as the citizenry. 

A nationalist China under Xi Jinping

Xi is a visionary leader like Deng, albeit in a very different sense. While Deng used to follow the philosophy of 'lying low' and "Hide your strength. Bide your time", Xi was open to the idea of the inevitable rise of China. Xi is more of an amalgam of Deng and Mao, open in terms of the vision of China but closed in terms of demeanour and leadership style. With Xi at the helm, the 'century of humiliation' and China's decline under imperialism have become catchphrases in China. Extreme nationalism (or Jingoism) has become China's go-to idea. Xi is the man who came at the helm to salvage the morally decaying Chinese society and the Party. His emphasis on curbing the 'corruption and bureaucratism' is something that made him a popular leader. Now here is the man, venerated like messiah, who is ready to take the bull by its horns and become the guiding force of the party as well as the citizenry. 

Xi Jinping and the party machinery's continuous harking back onto the idea of 'continuous struggle', ' continuous hard work' and 'following the core' are pushing China on the course of 'Cultural Revolution 2.0', as Mao once did to show his supremacy and compelled everyone to conform to his idea, that might turn disastrous in the future.

However, as China's domestic politics has taken a nationalistic turn, led by CCP's wolf-warriors, the idea of China's firm stand on its "internal matters" and abhorring what Xi described as "Sanctimonious preaching", during his Centenary speech, has provided an impetus to CCP's actions against what it perceives as the challenge to the party. The biggest weapons in the arsenal of the CCP to change the narrative Inside and outside its country was to use propaganda machinery and the united front works department (UFWD), respectively. In 2017, China brought the National Intelligence law to court its private firms to move in unison with the party and follow its guidelines. China's recent moves to rein in on those private firms that try to undermine the decree of the CCP (Alipay and Didi are some cases in point) has opened lacunae where the Chinese domestic politics is, increasingly, becoming harsh on any institution going against the diktats of the party or try to question the legitimacy of state institutions. Also, the historical study sessions, started by the CCP to educate people about the history of the party and its struggle, pushes the country on a path of wrong historical narratives inflated by disinformation campaigns orchestrated by state machinery that may lead to extreme politicization on matters that may warrant a rational thinking and a moderate standing. Today, the CCP values the redness in the genes, an analogy for reverence to the CCP, above everything else. Xi Jinping and the party machinery's continuous harking back onto the idea of 'continuous struggle and hard work ', 'building an ideologically moral party under the guidance of comrade Xi' and 'following the core' are pushing China on the course of 'Cultural Revolution 2.0', as Mao once tried to show his supremacy to weed out persons who, in his understanding, might pose challenges to his authority and compelled everyone to conform to his ideas, that might turn disastrous in the future.

The most intriguing part of the centenary function was Xi Jinping's speech. The speech was more comprehensive than one could have ever asked for, covering every possible domain concerning the nation (read Party). Xi's speech is the perfect example of the course that China is treading presently. Xi proudly declared of achieving its first centenary goal of making China a 'moderately prosperous society' (called 'Xiaokang' in Chinese). In his speech, he described the painstaking struggle of the CCP in building and transforming China, a country that was once mired by power struggles and revolutions to a thriving and confident one. His emphasis on the importance of the CCP in materializing the dream of rejuvenation, a word he used 47 times in his speech, of the Chinese nation and aligning the party's aspirations with people's aspirations, was to establish the legitimacy of the party and garner the unflinching support from the citizens. He, during his speech, enjoined the people about the importance of following the core of the party (means following Mr Xi) to lead China to its rightful destiny in the world. Xi's assertion of upholding the "ideology of Socialism with Chinese characteristics" and "following the Chinese path to modernization" was to throw light on a model, that has been and will continue to be, most suitable for the Chinese nation.

During his address, Xi's assertion could not have been harsher when he said, "China will not let any foreign force bully, oppress, or subjugate us. Anyone who would attempt to do so will find themselves on a collision course with a great wall of steel forged by over 1.4 billion Chinese people." His candour while saying, "We are eager to learn what lessons we can from the achievements of other cultures, and welcome helpful suggestions and constructive criticism. We will not, however, accept sanctimonious speech from those who feel they have the right to lecture us", was to point a finger towards the critics of the policies of the CCP related to 'human rights conditions' in Hong Kong and Xinjiang. Xi also mentioned Hong Kong and Xinjiang, emphasizing their importance for the territorial integrity of China, as well as Taiwan, hailing for the reunification of Taiwan in a "peaceful manner" as a main national project of the CCP.

Xi, in his speech, laid down the goal for the second centenary, in 2049, to make China a strong socialist country, called global China 2049, which also include laying down the work of making a hybrid multilateral order of community with a shared future for mankind that would work on the principle of equality, peaceful existence and mutual understanding of internal affairs, instead of the present, unjust, order based on unilateralism of the US.

Challenges before the CCP

Be that as it may, China does understand the roadblocks ahead of its future goals. Xi himself, during his speech, made it clear that ensuring a strong military and thriving technological domain will be the goal of China to ward off future challenges in an uncertain international environment that may arise before the Chinese nation. China's coalition with Russia is a clear indication of this paranoia. Furthermore, China is well aware of the possible challenges that may arise should the western world remain on an anti-China course in the times to come. This has led China to turn the argument of 'Cold war 2.0' on its head and term it as a zero-sum game mentality that may not benefit anyone.

On top of this, the domestic developments, mainly the ageing population of China, has raised concerns that would the CCP be able to achieve its second centenary goal. Furthermore, the crackdown on private technology firms has raised the issue that would China be able to achieve supremacy in the information age when it is trying to do the opposite domestically that would suppress the free environment important for these firms to thrive.

This idea (China's inevitable rise) has many takers in China which indicate that as far as the domestic romanticization with this idea continues, the course, on which China presently is, will continue, albeit with a few moderations in between to not antagonize others to take extreme measures. 

The biggest questions that warrant scrutiny, at the present point, are, how far China is prepared to go onto this path and how will it try to shape the world order? The sense that China is now ready to take on the world (read the West) is omnipresent and heightened by the nationalistic undertones of the CCP. Even in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis when the west was recalcitrant and abandoned to lead the world in the post-financial crisis era, China's sense of importance on its domestic system became inflated and a sense of moral superiority took a semblance. This idea (of China's inevitable rise) has many takers in China which indicate that as far as the domestic romanticization with this idea continues, the course, on which China presently is, will continue, albeit with a few moderations in between to not antagonize others to take extreme measures. This would undermine confidence in the international environment about China and its ambitions. The recent COVID-19 'lab-leak theory' and China's subsequent opacity of the matter has raised further concerns about the internal working mechanisms of China. As far as the question of world order is concerned, China itself does not want to change the present order of which it is the biggest beneficiary (China's continuous insistence on maintaining the multilateral and globalized world order under the leadership of the UN order shows this) until it becomes irksome for China to continue in the present conditions. The CCP is more worried, not less, about the growing closeness and anti-globalization fervour in the world which may hinder the growth of the Chinese economy when it is needed the most, mainly to reach above the US's economy, feed the Chinese nationalism and establish the legitimacy of the party.

The CCP, which has enjoyed 100 years of rule without any challenge, is mindful of all the challenges before its authority that may arise in the future. It knows that it does not presently enjoy the comparative advantage that it used to enjoy once and the slow growth in the economy, due to COVID-19, coupled with the lurking challenge of getting engaged into a middle-income trap, an ageing population and a hostile external environment, all are going against the vision of a rising China. This will make the CCP more resolute in its struggle for national rejuvenation as it will continue to invoke the idea of a 'century of humiliation' and nationalism to legitimize its actions. However, the party (CCP) is missing forest for the woods and it will become clear to the party, sooner than later, that no one has risen to the top by nurturing continuous animosity and remaining in a silo, and no one will, ever, be able to do so in the future. 

 

Revisiting the crisis along LAC to understand the future of Sino-Indian relationship

 Since the unfolding of border crisis along the LAC, facts have been changed and the ante has been raised by both sides, a semblance of normalcy was seen to be achieved after 10th commander level talks between both sides where the dis-engagement deal was reached for the Pangong Tso area, though infringement in other three areas remained. However, things reversed upside down with 11th commander level talks between both armies, with PLA signalling a no-compromise approach along the LAC by pushing for an approach of de-escalation before an actual dis-engagement. This has created tumult among policy circles in India with people speculating umpteen possibilities of this move by China. However, the main reason seems elusive. This begs us to revisit this big question of the Indian security challenge which is lurking over India’s security and foreign policy ambitions and ask what will be the future of the India-China relationship given the development of the anti-China alliance in the recent past.

Crisis at the LAC

It all started on May 5 when the Chinese side started changing the facts on the ground by infringing over the Indian side of the LAC. Many firsts were seen during this prolonged crisis until a breakthrough was achieved after 10th commander level talks between both armies which paved the way for disengagement at Pangong Tso. However, things changed with 11th commander level talks, when China shoved, their perceived, status quo onto India while suggesting for de-escalation without any mention of disengagement. What does this entail? Given the fact that India has a deficit of infrastructure along the LAC vis-à-vis China, if an approach of de-escalation before disengagement was to be followed it would give China an upper hand to deploy resources faster compared to India in any future escalation. This brings to the fore the psyche of the PRC to escalate the cost and try to entangle India along with the continental domain while making forays in the maritime domain for its strategic interests. The question is, why do they want to do that?

In Science of military strategy 2013, an invaluable document to understand the thinking of the PLA, Chinese strategists dedicated a separate section for India whereby they defined India as a maritime power and a threat to the Chinese strategic interests in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Juxtapose this with the recent happenings in the IOR- formation of the Quad, the US’s assertion of free and open Indo-Pacific, deteriorating relations of China with its neighbours and the EU’s strategic move to focus on the Indo-Pacific- that accentuates the paranoia with Beijing. While it is a fact that securing the Sea Lines of communication (SLOC) in the Indian Ocean and pushing for BRI in the region, are two of the most important medium-to-long-term goals of China, the boiling LAC should be looked at from this perspective of China diverting attention from their area of prime concern. Further, by raising the ante along the LAC, Beijing has tried to raise the cost for India to deter it from looking towards its maritime realm, a strategy to control the movement of the adversary by posing an imminent threat so that adversary would look for its short-term interests while neglecting the long-term ones, in other words, compel the adversary to take the step which you want the adversary to take.

So, in this sense, the denial of the PLA must not surprise us, for it is one of the inevitables that has been transparent since the start of the crisis. Further, the concomitance of the development of the railway link connecting Sichuan with Tibet and the development of border villages close to the LAC while the crisis is still unfolding along the border points to one direction that Beijing has been raising the cost for New Delhi. It was New Delhi's intransigence that has led it to the crisis of this magnitude that poses a threat for India in strategic as well as the economic domain, which Arzan Tarapore described as ‘Crisis after the crisis for India’. Further, the lurking danger of a two-front war with Pakistan and China has ringed alarm bells among the policymaking circles of New Delhi. This accentuates the cost for India where it has minimal wherewithal to deal with the emanating threat which has a huge potential to undermine India's interests in the region. The best that India could do as enunciated by Sushant Sareen is, “to avoid getting trapped into preparing for a two-front war. If not, the Indian military is likely to be bogged down in an unviable position: resource-constrained, overstretched, and vulnerable.”

Future of Sino-Indian ties

Amidst the ferocious second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, India defenestrated its long-held disaster management policy and urged the countries around the globe for help. While help from India’s allies and partners was expected, what came as a surprise was Beijing’s insistence to help India enthusiastically. This was followed by Xi Jinping’s letter to the Indian PM, Chinese EAM Wang Yi’s telephone call with Dr S. Jaishankar and empathetic messages by Chinese citizens pouring over Chinese social media showing their solidarity and support for India’s fight against COVID-19. It was in this backdrop that India launched a slew of measures to decouple its economy from that of China's and the latest being in this arsenal is the start of 5G trials in India with no Chinese telecom giant being a part of it. What does this signify?

India’s ambassador to China, Vikram Misri, in a press conference at Beijing put it out bluntly by saying that "the habit of sweeping the issues under the carpet and characterizing it as a minor issue and a matter of perspective is unadvisable as it would take us further away from a sustained solution to present difficulties and deeper into an unfulfilling stalemate.” This was further corroborated by EAM Dr S. Jaishankar when he said that, “Since the oncoming of Pandemic, India-China relationship is under a severe stress and the relationship cannot be immune to changes in the assumptions that underpinned it.” The message was loud and clear that things cannot move back to normal unless work is done on the ground to resolve the biggest problem straining Sino-Indian relations i.e., the unresolved boundary. 

At a time when Beijing is testing countries around it by escalating the disputes, a new semblance of the anti-China alliance is emerging to the fore. Since the Trump era, Sino-US relations have deteriorated and the new administration under Joe Biden has bolstered it further by demarcating its stance vis-à-vis China. This was made clear during Anchorage talks and the recent G-7 meeting, where India and S. Africa were invited as the guest countries, where the issue about human-rights abuse in Xinjiang, repression of Hong-Kong, belligerence in Taiwan strait and the South China Sea, were discussed and a statement was issued whereby these countries stated their concerns. This was in the backdrop of surging nationalism across China against the West and its increasing efforts to cajole countries desperate for vaccines and antagonized by the absence of the west to help them. It is obvious that being an attendant to the meeting, India has some role in this but the bigger picture is, a bandwagon is in place which is strident to push China to assert a status-quo against the revisionist policies of Beijing.

Given this in mind, turbulence in the India-China bilateral relationship is here to stay and would become clearer than ever as things will proceed forward. This aligns with the changing strategic interests and threat perception with New Delhi, which has nudged New Delhi to go forward in abandoning its long-held reticence over antagonizing Beijing.

Conclusion

A die has been cast in the Sino-Indian relationship after the recent crisis along the LAC which has got aggravated by policies like rule-based order and alternative supply chains under the aegis of the Quad, which will have palpable ramifications for the future of the global order. At a time when two of the oldest civilizations are fighting to reclaim their past glory and position as a leader of the world in general and the region in particular, ameliorations in the relationship is the last thing we can expect at this point. It is at this point that it would be important for India to carve its policy out to deal with this overhanging threat, lest it should be compelled to either face a debacle like the one it faced during 1962 or take desperate measures as it did during the current crisis.

The Triangular Geopolitics

 

As the US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and NSA Jake Sullivan met their Chinese counterpart Wang Yi and Yang Jiechi in Anchorage, Alaska little did they expect was the chutzpah with which China would confront the US. When Yang Jiechi obliterated the US of its contradictions on moral high grounds and its irony to check in on other countries when its house itself is not in order, Chinese strategic commentators and experts termed it as the “rise of a confident China” and “a grand show of Chinese strength”. The moot point is, how has this backlash against the west being played out and what ramifications would it have to the relationship of two economic giants in an increasingly polarized world.

Since Biden emerged at the helm of the US, China was sending pacifist signals, initially, intending to ameliorate the relations, which were soon turned down by the new US administrations as it showed zeal to follow the footstep of its predecessor on issues vis-à-vis the Indo-pacific in general and China in particular. As Beijing sensed this, nationalistic rhetoric (Chinese boycott of foreign companies like H&M, Nike, Adidas etc.) and game of delegitimization (Propaganda through news and digital-media) started. This surge clashed with the centenary of the CCP in 2021, an increasingly important year for the party to showcase the growing, confident and prosperous Chinese nation without any fear under the command of the party, which started with a zealous attempt to change the narratives. As this confident China confronted with a bullying west, according to their perception, war of words ensued with backlash emanating out of different domains of the Chinese regime, a taste of which we got during the anchorage meeting.

Adding to that is the story of sanctions and cross-sanctions, with both parties using every resource under their dispensation to change the rule of the games and turning the tables. Agree or not, this reverberates with the shadow of cold war politics with a battle of supremacy turning into a battle between ideologies and propagandas, with the sole exception that the west is increasingly facing an adversary that has the economy to continuously serve the barrel of the gun and inflict punitive costs. When China shrug-off every move of the west which are aimed to malign its record on the human rights and the rule of law issue, while opening a new interpretation of these ideas and terms based on the existing political and historical context of the country, it is overtly trying to portray a parallel model of successful governance to the world. Be that as it may, one thing which one cannot overlook is that this parallel or alternative model has its own set of takers in some parts of the world, that is why Chinese hopes are not drowning under the burden of losing the limelight which had happened with the Soviet Union.

 This reverberates with the shadow of cold war politics with a battle of supremacy turning into a battle between ideologies and propagandas, with the sole exception that the west is increasingly facing an adversary that has the economy to continuously serve the barrel of the gun and inflict punitive costs.

What is interesting is the façade of grandeur which has been created by these events giving a moral high ground, in the perception of China, to the Chinese tradition vis-à-vis the west. This grandeur is what we saw during the COVID-19 pandemic, as China forayed and opened various fronts at the same time, at a time when some commentators think that it would lead to a demise of Beijing’s soft power. That certainly has not been manifested and this has been the main nudge behind the tactic which has been employed by the Chinese. At this crucial juncture, one might wonder but think, how it might affect the Indian aspirations and interests in the future and what course should India need to take to deal with future threats more efficiently.

As the Indian foreign policy has undergone a drastic change after the Galwan clash and friction at various points with the Chinese, options seem very limited with New Delhi. Adding to that, the growing expectation of the west on India is continuously clashing with the growing hue and cry among a few to adopt a policy of "strategic autonomy". Interestingly enough, the repercussions for India are more imminent with the rise of China and its alternative structure than for the west and taking cognizance of this, policy should be effective to deal with the emerging situations. With that in mind, India has to adopt a comprehensive strategy for both short and long-term objectives, as has been opined by China watchers like Gautam Bambawale, Vijay Kelkar et al., in a policy paper for Pune International Centre. The short-term policy must consist of alliances with like-minded countries to deal with the Chinese threat while the long-term policy must consist of forging a path to bolster the Indian economy and then using it to deal with China. As this game gets dirty and opaque, India has to steer clear of the policy oblivion state, with which it has been characterized when dealing with the Chinese in the past and should ride on the democratic credentials, often considered cliché in realist perspective, though useful enough to court others in its favour. Agree or not, the biggest challenge with India is its domestic policy and economic policy. Only when these get aligned with the diplomatic interest of India, should we get the desired result.

India has to adopt a comprehensive strategy for both short and long-term objectives. The short-term policy must consist of alliances with the like-minded country to deal with the Chinese threat while the long-term policy must consist of forging a path to bolster the Indian economy and then using it to deal with China

It is not only the rule of the game but also the whole game that is in the process of transformation, which has raised ambiguity as well as hopes. Never has the world faced so much tumultuousness as it has been facing due to COVID-19 and the growing rift between the two biggest powers of the world (the US and China), which poses a new set of challenges that can only be dealt with newly devised policies. Amid these tremors, it will remain interesting to see how New Delhi will adopt its policies vis-à-vis the US and China, in the times to come.

 

 

 

Two Signals emanating out of the Indo-Pacific region

 

The news of the Quadrilateral security dialogue between India, Japan, Australia and the US, to be held virtually this month has reinvigorated the security environment of the Indo-Pacific region. While the new Biden administration, at the helm, in the US has decreed its continuance with Trump’s China policy of pressurizing, sending red signals to China, the picture in the Himalayas is rather ameliorating with the two Asian giants currently disengaging along the LAC. However, these new developments in the security apparatus of the Indo-Pacific have sent two broad inter-related signals which need to be considered when looking at the relationship between the trio of India-China-the US in global politics.

The first signal is a concrete policy direction of New Delhi. The China challenge of India has cemented the view, often neglected in the military and policy circles, of China, is a major threat to Indian aspirations at the regional as well as at the global level. In calculating policy options at hand with New Delhi, policymakers find a defunct organization (Quad) to deal with Beijing. Since then, the mindset of dousing the fire of apprehension among the minds of the policymakers of Beijing and placating Beijing while denouncing the US’s embrace of India has been defenestrated and actions on the ground have been taken to save the domestic as well as the global interest of New Delhi, the cases of banning Chinese apps to decouple from the Chinese economy and swiftly moving with the Quad are some cases in point. Since the disengagement process is happening, the official view among the politburo of CPC (Communist Party of China) is that India will backtrack from this Quad initiative and again switch to the old method of idealist diplomacy vis-à-vis China. This could be gauge through what Wang Yi, State chancellor and foreign minister of China, said after talking to EAM Dr S. Jaishankar while the disengagement is in the process along the LAC that boundary disputes are historic problems and they do not show the full picture of India-China relations, signalling to hit an optimistic note of back to business approach with New Delhi. However, these optimist notes have been watered-down by New Delhi when it showcased to hedge its bet on the Quad despite a conciliatory approach by China along the LAC, the same was seen during the Modi-Biden phone call. The question is, what it might entail, with these developments, for China?

The official view among the politburo of CPC (Communist Party of China) is that India will backtrack from this Quad initiative and again switch to the old method of idealist diplomacy vis-à-vis China

The fact that India-China relations are at an irreparable juncture needs further scrutiny, but the direction to Indian foreign policy has, more or less, been defined with the border incursions along the LAC. Further, the Indo-Pak agreement of adhering to the ceasefire pact, though far-fetching, has given some credence to bolstering Indian foreign policy choices which have led to its adversary to give it some way at the global level. That perception of India defenestrating the Quad and US’s alliance after disengagement has dissipated, in Wang Yi’s eulogy, like the seafoam. India’s perseverance at the borders has sent a signal to Beijing that New Delhi has not budged and will not do so in the future. This means that China has limited options vis-à-vis India and its bargaining power has been constrained.

Connected to the first signal is the second signal, which begs us to look inside the domestic politics of Beijing, which portrays Beijing’s acceptance of the challenge it faces. While unveiling the 14^th five-year plan, President Xi Jinping enunciated the idea of “Dual Circulation Policy”, which in layman terms means “Aatmanirbhar China”, which, in Xi’s thinking, is an important step to warding-off external threats from some nations, coercing and bullying China, by making China self-reliant on domestic markets while concomitantly making the world more dependent on China through technological innovation. Once the wheel of dual-circulation will start moving, it will, according to official thinking, make the Chinese economy more resilient and will secure Chinese domestic as well as global interests. This policy should be looked at keeping in mind the hindsight of global politics and the great power competition between the US and China. The official thinking in Beijing is that there is an imminent danger from Washington and New Delhi and Quad partners are working as a catalyst to this danger, which needs to be taken care of. The best and the most effective way to do this could be making our house more resilient to external threats while making the adversary more vulnerable (read dependent). Owing to its limited options this policy seems more viable in the present scenario for Beijing, and should it be successful, it could turn the table around.

The official thinking in Beijing is that there is an imminent danger from Washington and New Delhi and Quad partners are working as a catalyst to this danger, which needs to be taken care of. The best and the most effective way to do that could be making our house more resilient to external threats while making the adversary more vulnerable (read dependent)

Keeping both of these broad signals in mind, one thing which might be construed is that Beijing is accepting the threat emanating out of the US and the Quad. Whatever it says, about the optimism it has over the new Biden administration’s working with China or counting on New Delhi to be back in business with China, is a veneer to cloak the inner fear, or say the biggest fear, of a coalition being formed against Beijing. The trio of India-China-the US will see a lot of string-pulling given the fact that lines have been drawn on the sand to send out a red signal to the adversary either to budge or face consequences. The decision to move forward with the Quad by the member countries, despite pressure ratcheting down from Beijing and no lurking Chinese danger in the foreseeable future, is one such signal which is out and loud. Now it remains interesting to be seen how Beijing will react to it in the times to come.

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This article was originally published in The Eastern Herald.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

A carrot or a hanging stick?

The news of an agreement being signed between India and China about the disengagement process along the LAC, as conveyed by MOD Rajnath Singh during the Rajya Sabha proceeding points to the consensus being formed after nine iterations of rigorous military-level talks held concomitantly with diplomatic-level talks under the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs (WMCC). During his address, while highlighting India’s willingness for disengagement, the minister points out the illegal Chinese occupation in UT of Ladakh. The address of the minister talks about a phased, coordinated and verified disengagement process in the north and south bank of Lake Pangong Tso to achieve the status quo ante of April, with a period of 48 hours for the next round of talks over the remaining areas after the completion of disengagement from the Pangong lake area. While the agreement rekindled hopes of de-escalation between the two Asian giants, it has brought to the fore some questions over the Chinese intention to disengage from other areas (including Hot Springs, Galwan Valley and Depsang Plains) as well as the time chosen for this agreement.

This agreement has been agreed upon after nine months of eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation between India and China, resulting in brinkmanship and tumultuousness in global politics. With so much happening on the world stage, clashes between Indian and Chinese forces worked as a force multiplier to the problems faced by the world. This culminated in new coalitions being formed, new thresholds being set and new narratives being created. Perhaps, one thing which becomes clear at the end of the second decade of the 21st century is that everything related to the present world order is obsolete and renewing it is the only way forward. 

This culminated in new coalitions being formed, new thresholds being set and new narratives being created

When the leader of the world, the US, was facing internal problems with a reticent attitude towards its globalist approach, the Chinese were the first to offer an alternative in asserting its credentials as a world agent for multilateralism. And it was at this juncture, when China used the salami-slicing tactic onto India and its neighbours (Taiwan and south-China sea neighbours) through border incursions and belligerence, viewing it as the most opportune time for making headways by pursuing active Defence tactics. However, India did provide a big hurdle to the Chinese ambitions, the fact remains that the repetitions of such actions along unresolved borders cast a death knell to the idea touted by a Chinese envoy to India, Sun Weidong of “Dragon and Elephant dancing together as the only right choice”. As India pushed China to negotiate after raising the ante by occupying the heights of the Kailash range and compelling Beijing to come to the negotiating table, successive talks did not bear any fruits.

The fact remains that the repetitions of such actions along unresolved borders cast a death knell to the idea touted by a Chinese envoy to India, Sun Weidong of “Dragon and Elephant dancing together as the only right choice”

While the agreement needs to be seen as a small step towards total disengagement, the fact remains that three flashpoints ( Depsang plains, Galwan valley and Hot Spring areas) remain to be resolved. A huge trust deficit remains between India and China which is hard to overcome unless some concrete steps are taken on the ground and going by the Chinese track record, one cannot trust China which claims to be the new poster child of multilateralism and rule-based order while doing the opposite on the ground. The question must also be raised over the timing of the Chinese intention to disengage, when the new President of the US, Joe Biden, has agreed to work closely towards a rule-based order, free and open Indo-pacific and on the Quad with India, while talking to India PM Narendra Modi on the one hand and raised issues over Xinjiang, Hongkong and belligerence of China in the Indo-Pacific, while talking to Chinese president Xi Jinping on the other. Perhaps, one thing which also needs to be taken into consideration is the WHO’s claim of the virus (COVID) not emanating from a Chinese lab, which has delegitimized the claim of COVID being a China virus and giving China room to spread new theories over its origin, which remained one of the main points of China asserting its claims along the LAC and elsewhere, to diffuse tensions simmering in its internal politics.

With all said and done, returning to the status quo of India-China bilateral relations is a far-fetched thing and repairing it might only happen with delineation of the LAC by both sides, through a collaborative and consensus-building exercise. What can be done in the short-term is put cost over every action that China will take in the future through capacity building measures at various levels from infrastructure to military-level to diplomatic-level. With a dearth of active measures taken by the Indian side to counter the looming threat of China, pursuing a sea-denial tactic strategy over the existing sea-capture strategy by the Indian Navy in the Indian Ocean with concomitantly embarking on a path of proactive military modernization is the way forward for India. With the lack of capital requirement for these measures, it is high time for India to have some serious considerations over the economic path that India should take in the future because the economy might always predate the military might.

It is high time for India to have some serious considerations over the economic path that India should take in the future because the economy might always predate the military might

Though contention remains between India and China over other areas, yet this agreement should be seen as a move in the right direction. Now it remains to be seen, what will happen in the time to come because we must always remember what Zhao Enlai said, “All diplomacy is a continuation of war by other means”, and this war, as espoused by Zhao, will be fierce and long-drawn between the two-Asian giants as they carve their path out in the post-COVID world.

 

 

Panacea for India's problems

 

As the world has entered the third decade of 21st Century after the tumultuousness of 2020, the rollout of the vaccine has rekindled hopes in the minds of the people with optimism that the future will be better. But as we pause and look in retrospect of what has happened in the past decade, we are anything but hopeful. The condition of the Indian economy, which had been facing tailwinds from several quarters in the pre-pandemic years has gone from bad to worse with an expected permanent loss of as much as $20 trillion due to COVID-19, as per a report by Credit Suisse. On top of this, Indian borders are facing the heat of an assertive neighbour with no sign of thaw in the near future. So, what could be done in this scenario? What panacea do we need to solve these problems?

As a matter of fact, the problems related to economics need a calibrated approach with retrofitting at several places to get out of the fiscally-tight position faced by the government. With the budget in the offing, hopes are high that government could do better by assigning more credit support to pandemic induced poor through austerity measure and fiscally-crunched SMEs through credit supply and concessions while having a forward-looking vision for a fast-paced growth of the Indian economy and averting a, rather euphemistic, K-shaped growth. In a recent interview to Economic Times, Raghuram Rajan, ex-RBI Governor touts the idea of giving more leeway to States in spending their way to recovery and investing more on infrastructure to get out of this problem and concomitantly looking beyond stimulus measures for underlying structural issues facing the Indian economy. 

"Replacing the narrative of Aatmanirbhar Bharat (Self-reliant India) with Atma Vishwasi Bharat (Self-confident India) to ameliorate the discourse among foreign investors."

However, rather than getting more open vis-a-vis global markets, the idea of “Aatmanirbharta” is making rounds in the country. While seems to be a perfect narrative which might be able to strike the right chord with an emotional being and connecting him with the country’s clarion call to be self-reliant, this has raised eyebrows in the foreign markets over India’s inward turn. With the deluge of the world economy with inward turning or rather xenophobic output brewing among countries who were at the forefront of globalisation, the likes of the US and the UK, the narrative of Aatmanirbhar Bharat does everything but making investors sanguine. What is needed is an approach that helps India connect with global investors on a positive note and defenestrating our obsession with "Aatmanirbhar" industrial policy and recommiting to being a leader on new trade mechanism, as Mihir Swarup Sharma puts in his article.  In a recent article written by Rama Bijapurkar in the Indian Express, she called for replacing the narrative of “Aatmanirbhar Bharat” (Self-reliant India) with “Atma Vishwasi Bharat” (Self-confident Bharat) to ameliorate the discourse among foreign investors.

In the 5th Plenum of CPC’s central committee meeting, addressing the members, president Xi espoused the idea of “Dual-circulation” for the growth of the country in the future. He emphasised on the changing geo-economic realities of the world and encouraged to embark on the mission of shifting the tilt of the Chinese economy from global exports to domestic markets while retaining a hegemonistic position in global supply chains. It might look like an inward turn of China, but the way it was presented has assuaged the global investors in keeping faith over China at a time when global discourse against China has turned foul in recent years. Juxtaposing this with the recent deal between the EU and China on Investment, might corroborate the Chinese intention of openness. What are the learnings from this?

"India needs to be clever enough to take the economic advantage to be at par with the Chinese economy instead of getting stymied by its emotions to take forced decisions."

The above example teaches the need to learn and adapt as per the prevailing conditions while allaying the fears through choosing the narrative with caution and linking foreign policy with economic policy for developing a double-edged sword that might come handy in the future. Indian strategic and policy circles are failing while missing this node of how we can learn from China. We might be looking at the problem we have in the short-term while missing on some of the long-term benefits. The idea of not joining RCEP, rather seem alluring in the short-term, has some long-term serious ramifications for Indian geo-strategic and geo-economic interests, unless commensurate by individual free-trade agreements. In a webinar, Kishore Mahbubani, a Singaporean diplomat of Indian descent and author of Has China Won? The Chinese challenge to American primacy said that India needs to be cunning enough to take the economic advantage to be at par with the Chinese economy instead of getting stymied by its emotions to take forced decisions. 

While the idea of opening up and mending ways with China in concluding economic deals might seem self-deceiving, it is the other way round. It is the idea of making India economically strong because unless it is economically strong it cannot be militarily strong. Critics will say that there are other ways like making India self-reliant by developing national capacity or allying with the western countries for containing China, but the problem with these ideas is, neither do we have the technological and capital capacity to be self-reliant nor do we the bargaining power to make the ends meet in a western-led alliance on our terms. It is time to figure out what is more important, our short-term reticence instiagted by emotions or long-term benefits because the fact remains that our foreign policy is delineated from our economic policy and our vision is influenced by the emotions of Chinese incursions on the border areas.

While we may ponder over different dimensions of countering China, but the fact is China is too strong to be militarily defeated and too mighty to be economically bullied albeit having a weakling in the diplomatic route. The chance to have an edge lies in our diplomacy while linking it to our economy for a long-term vision of military modernization and building asymmetric warfare capability to counter China. For that, the western alliance will come handy to develop the military ties but that does not mean that opportunities that come to India could be neglected. It is high time to take reflective decisions on our policies thus far and to learn from the enemy we are facing on our borders and adapt because as Sun Tzu puts it, “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.” 

India's options in the changing nature of the Gulf region

It was 3rd January 2020, when the US's drone struck the Baghdad International Airport killing one of the most coveted men of Iran, Kasim Soleimani, the commander of Iran Revolutionary Guards' Quds Force, which has created a splinter effect throughout the gulf region. Iran, which was facing the heat due to the collapse of JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action), turned rogue against the US and in retaliation struck two Iraqi military facilities of the US, with no casualties. What started as minor bottlenecks from the Trump administration turned into brinkmanship that has infiltrated the Gulf region ushering in the new deals in the form of Abraham Accords between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco, providing a thaw to the long-held animosity between Israel and the gulf.

However, things are not as simple as they look. The recent killing of Iranian nuclear scientist Mohsen Farikhzade, allegedly by Israel, has turned the events to a point of no turning back. The recent legislation in the Iranian parliament regarding the breach of nuclear stockpile restrictions up to 20%, way up than what was agreed upon in JCPOA at 3.6%, has exacerbated the matters. Further, the feud happening in the Iranian politics between Ayatollah Khamenei supported by hard-liners and incumbent President Hassan Rouhani supported by moderates, with the looming elections to be held in mid-2021 has impeded the process of amelioration of ties with the US. 

Whilst all that is happening is worth noting, one thing which could set the trajectory of the Gulf either to moderation of ties or a situation on the brink of war, is the Abraham accords. Two things are worth considering when we talk about these accords. First, this accord has emerged as a clear anti-Iranian accord to capture the rise of Iran in the Gulf region and has nudged both Israel and the Gulf to clear out the differences. Second, this accord is a face-saving deal by the Saudis and the Emiratis due to their losing position in the Muslim world with the projected resurrection of Turkey, as a neo-ottoman empire, trying to project itself as the leader of the disintegrating Muslim world.

The Abraham accords are pushing the gulf to be the major flashpoint for years to come at a time when the world is facing challenges on various fronts from an archaic world order unable to contain an assertive China to the worldwide spread of a pandemic. With the changing scenario in the gulf, speculations are rife over what might be the stance of India in the future, which has welcomed the accords but concomitantly supported the Palestinian cause.

Whilst pondering over this issue is imperative for Indian policymakers, four things need to be taken into consideration before taking a major step ahead:

First, India is facing a catch-22 situation whereby it cannot backtrack from its long-held position on Palestine and ignore its traditional-ally Iran on the one hand while supporting the accords on the other. However, given the numbers of the diaspora (approx. 31 million) working in the Gulf region and India's burgeoning military and technological partnership with Israel, New Delhi has no other choice but to recalibrate its options and make some hard choices.

Second, whilst the hype over traditional ties with Iran looks alluring, the alleged coalition forming between China, Iran, Turkey and Pakistan, coupled with a belligerent China poses a threat to Indian interests in the gulf region. The recent incident of Chinese intelligence agents colluding with Pakistani agents and the Taliban, and Chinese meddling in Nepalese politics are some cases in point. New Delhi has two options either to defenestrate the accords and become vulnerable or to work in the direction of standing up for its interests.

Third, India's ailing economy which has been facing headwinds due to COVID is in a need of a major overhaul. Whilst the west and other regions are attractive players to invest in the Indian economy, the gulf countries which are in the need of diversifying their economic interests away from hydrocarbons sees India as a major market and destination to invest in. Juxtaposing these two scenarios of debilitating Indian economy and investment-willing Gulf, the salience of the gulf for India is an undeniable fact considering Indian needs.

Fourth, the gulf could be a partner for India in fighting against the problem of terrorism which have been hampering Indian interest for a long-time. Further, Israel and the gulf's partnership could be a major force for India in capturing the growing influence of radicalisation in the Indian subcontinent on the behest of few countries like Pakistan, while making it a more peaceful and amicable place.

Given the fact that there is a change of administration in the US which could become a major force for further turbulence in the region, things are becoming more alarming with the way they are proceeding. However, one thing which ought to remain constant is that India needs to be cognizant of its interests in the region and its steps should align with its interests on the ground even if it will have to make some hard choices or reposition some of its long-held ideas.