On the night of 29-30 August 2020, again the agreed-upon status quo was broken down in one another play of adventurism by PLA, which in turn was thwarted by the Indian Army. Since the last clashes between the Indian Army and PLA on 15-16 June, tensions between both sides are brewing, irrespective of parallel military and diplomatic talks.
Tensions are easily palpable considering the statements, like the one of India's CDS Bipin Rawat who was talking of considering military options if diplomatic and military talks do not materialize or the one of Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi's saying that ambiguity along the border is the reason for clashes and his further adding about China's assertiveness over sovereignty and integrity of the Chinese land, which clearly shows the growing apprehension between both sides.
It is now a matter of the fact that India's continued reluctance to acknowledge the threat from growing China has caught New Delhi off-guard in a situation like the one now, but it is equally worth considering that the way things are getting heated up now in areas where contestation has never been materialized before (Pangong Tso and Galwan valley), shows that things are changing faster than what has been anticipated by Indian policymakers.
India and China have held five rounds of border talks to de-escalate the matters but to no avail. As China has further added to the deployed forces since the start of the stalemate in April, so does India, leading to mirroring of each other's positions. Reports show that China has deployed layers of heavy artillery, tanks, heavy machine guns, and aircraft on bases in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). To add more to this, China has started deploying surface-to-air missiles near Kailash-Mansarovar, a sacred site for Hindu pilgrimage, which clearly shows the intent of China to provocate and worsen the matters. In addition, the missile base also hosts the Dong-Feng-21 (DF-21) ballistic missile with a range of 2200 km and sits at the mouth of the transboundary rivers that include the Brahmaputra, Sutlej, Indus and Karnali, making matters worse for India.
A growing force tilting in favour of China has prompted it to adopt a punishment-based strategy along the LAC, which in turn has made India ambivalent. Taking a cue from the 2013 Depsang clashes where a punishment-based strategy by the Indian side to cross the LAC and occupy to negotiate with the Chinese, the time slot for this strategy is now over for India. Whereas in the 2017 Doklam standoff a denial strategy was adopted by holding onto the grounds which helped India to negotiate, but this time around this strategy does not seem to be working in the Indian favour.
Taking a cue from the 2013 Depsang clashes where a punishment-based strategy by the Indian side to cross the LAC and occupy to negotiate with the Chinese, the time slot for this strategy is now over for India. Whereas, the 2017 Doklam standoff denial strategy was adopted by holding onto the grounds which helped India to negotiate, but this time around this strategy does not seem to be working in Indian favour.
With the furtherance of this stalemate and the Chinese strategy of nibbling away Indian territory with small and swift actions, commonly known as Salami-slice tactics, India is in a treacherous position to balance between ongoing confrontation and Economic destabilisation due to COVID-19. Adding to these woes, China is using sugar-daddy Diplomacy to win brownie points in the Indian neighbourhood to counter the diplomatic threats from India and its western allies.
As matters become worse along the LAC, deployment and seriousness will mirror that of the LOC, which demarcates the boundary between India and Pakistan, and will truly rise to the aspirations of "Iron brotherhood" between China and Pakistan to destabilise India. Indian options are very limited but a threat from the prospect of a two-front war is an opportune time for India to consider some asymmetric options to clearly show the intentions and demarcate a red-line whose crossing will lead to unparalleled actions from the Indian side.
Indian options are very limited but a threat from the prospect of a two-front war is an opportune time for India to consider some asymmetric options to clearly show the intentions and demarcate a red-line whose crossing will lead to unparalleled actions from the Indian side.
Equally important is to seize the opportunity to strengthen support against China and form coalitions to add diplomatic strength to the Indian salvo. The Indian path to be "Atma-nirbhar" needs further consideration to back it with a policy-led initiative to inflict a cost on the Chinese economy and give a befitting reply in the future. More military-led actions are needed to procure and strengthen the contingent to close the growing gap, concomitantly, Naval power is something that can be harnessed to further this effectiveness.
Chinese intentions to stabilise and destabilise border on its own will, are indicating a long-haul in the matters along the LAC which has accentuated the threat perception globally from China, but it has also given a chance to India to take a look into India's foreign policy vis-à-vis China with a different paradigm to change the currently existing models and make them more India- centric. It is now worth considering what John F. Kennedy puts by saying, "Domestic policy can only defeat us; foreign policy can kill us". Gauging the need for reconfiguration is very important when things are changing very fast, and this is where Indian foreign policy, as well as its visions, needs careful reconsideration to pose threats to adversaries when and where required.
