Since the unfolding of border crisis along the LAC, facts have been changed and the ante has been raised by both sides, a semblance of normalcy was seen to be achieved after 10th commander level talks between both sides where the dis-engagement deal was reached for the Pangong Tso area, though infringement in other three areas remained. However, things reversed upside down with 11th commander level talks between both armies, with PLA signalling a no-compromise approach along the LAC by pushing for an approach of de-escalation before an actual dis-engagement. This has created tumult among policy circles in India with people speculating umpteen possibilities of this move by China. However, the main reason seems elusive. This begs us to revisit this big question of the Indian security challenge which is lurking over India’s security and foreign policy ambitions and ask what will be the future of the India-China relationship given the development of the anti-China alliance in the recent past.
Crisis at the LAC
It all started on May 5 when the Chinese side started changing the facts on the ground by infringing over the Indian side of the LAC. Many firsts were seen during this prolonged crisis until a breakthrough was achieved after 10th commander level talks between both armies which paved the way for disengagement at Pangong Tso. However, things changed with 11th commander level talks, when China shoved, their perceived, status quo onto India while suggesting for de-escalation without any mention of disengagement. What does this entail? Given the fact that India has a deficit of infrastructure along the LAC vis-à-vis China, if an approach of de-escalation before disengagement was to be followed it would give China an upper hand to deploy resources faster compared to India in any future escalation. This brings to the fore the psyche of the PRC to escalate the cost and try to entangle India along with the continental domain while making forays in the maritime domain for its strategic interests. The question is, why do they want to do that?
In Science of military strategy 2013, an invaluable document to understand the thinking of the PLA, Chinese strategists dedicated a separate section for India whereby they defined India as a maritime power and a threat to the Chinese strategic interests in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Juxtapose this with the recent happenings in the IOR- formation of the Quad, the US’s assertion of free and open Indo-Pacific, deteriorating relations of China with its neighbours and the EU’s strategic move to focus on the Indo-Pacific- that accentuates the paranoia with Beijing. While it is a fact that securing the Sea Lines of communication (SLOC) in the Indian Ocean and pushing for BRI in the region, are two of the most important medium-to-long-term goals of China, the boiling LAC should be looked at from this perspective of China diverting attention from their area of prime concern. Further, by raising the ante along the LAC, Beijing has tried to raise the cost for India to deter it from looking towards its maritime realm, a strategy to control the movement of the adversary by posing an imminent threat so that adversary would look for its short-term interests while neglecting the long-term ones, in other words, compel the adversary to take the step which you want the adversary to take.
So, in this sense, the denial of the PLA must not surprise us, for it is one of the inevitables that has been transparent since the start of the crisis. Further, the concomitance of the development of the railway link connecting Sichuan with Tibet and the development of border villages close to the LAC while the crisis is still unfolding along the border points to one direction that Beijing has been raising the cost for New Delhi. It was New Delhi's intransigence that has led it to the crisis of this magnitude that poses a threat for India in strategic as well as the economic domain, which Arzan Tarapore described as ‘Crisis after the crisis for India’. Further, the lurking danger of a two-front war with Pakistan and China has ringed alarm bells among the policymaking circles of New Delhi. This accentuates the cost for India where it has minimal wherewithal to deal with the emanating threat which has a huge potential to undermine India's interests in the region. The best that India could do as enunciated by Sushant Sareen is, “to avoid getting trapped into preparing for a two-front war. If not, the Indian military is likely to be bogged down in an unviable position: resource-constrained, overstretched, and vulnerable.”
Future of Sino-Indian ties
Amidst the ferocious second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, India defenestrated its long-held disaster management policy and urged the countries around the globe for help. While help from India’s allies and partners was expected, what came as a surprise was Beijing’s insistence to help India enthusiastically. This was followed by Xi Jinping’s letter to the Indian PM, Chinese EAM Wang Yi’s telephone call with Dr S. Jaishankar and empathetic messages by Chinese citizens pouring over Chinese social media showing their solidarity and support for India’s fight against COVID-19. It was in this backdrop that India launched a slew of measures to decouple its economy from that of China's and the latest being in this arsenal is the start of 5G trials in India with no Chinese telecom giant being a part of it. What does this signify?
India’s ambassador to China, Vikram Misri, in a press conference at Beijing put it out bluntly by saying that "the habit of sweeping the issues under the carpet and characterizing it as a minor issue and a matter of perspective is unadvisable as it would take us further away from a sustained solution to present difficulties and deeper into an unfulfilling stalemate.” This was further corroborated by EAM Dr S. Jaishankar when he said that, “Since the oncoming of Pandemic, India-China relationship is under a severe stress and the relationship cannot be immune to changes in the assumptions that underpinned it.” The message was loud and clear that things cannot move back to normal unless work is done on the ground to resolve the biggest problem straining Sino-Indian relations i.e., the unresolved boundary.
At a time when Beijing is testing countries around it by escalating the disputes, a new semblance of the anti-China alliance is emerging to the fore. Since the Trump era, Sino-US relations have deteriorated and the new administration under Joe Biden has bolstered it further by demarcating its stance vis-à-vis China. This was made clear during Anchorage talks and the recent G-7 meeting, where India and S. Africa were invited as the guest countries, where the issue about human-rights abuse in Xinjiang, repression of Hong-Kong, belligerence in Taiwan strait and the South China Sea, were discussed and a statement was issued whereby these countries stated their concerns. This was in the backdrop of surging nationalism across China against the West and its increasing efforts to cajole countries desperate for vaccines and antagonized by the absence of the west to help them. It is obvious that being an attendant to the meeting, India has some role in this but the bigger picture is, a bandwagon is in place which is strident to push China to assert a status-quo against the revisionist policies of Beijing.
Given this in mind, turbulence in the India-China bilateral relationship is here to stay and would become clearer than ever as things will proceed forward. This aligns with the changing strategic interests and threat perception with New Delhi, which has nudged New Delhi to go forward in abandoning its long-held reticence over antagonizing Beijing.
Conclusion
A die has been cast in the Sino-Indian relationship after the recent crisis along the LAC which has got aggravated by policies like rule-based order and alternative supply chains under the aegis of the Quad, which will have palpable ramifications for the future of the global order. At a time when two of the oldest civilizations are fighting to reclaim their past glory and position as a leader of the world in general and the region in particular, ameliorations in the relationship is the last thing we can expect at this point. It is at this point that it would be important for India to carve its policy out to deal with this overhanging threat, lest it should be compelled to either face a debacle like the one it faced during 1962 or take desperate measures as it did during the current crisis.
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