The day of the 1st of July in China was celebrated with extreme grandeur, power projection and chutzpah, as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) celebrated 100 years of its foundation. When Mr Xi addressed the crowd of 70,000 people from the ramparts of Tiananmen square, a symbolic place, wearing a Mao suit, he projected the tenacity and hard work of the party in building the Chinese nation and concomitantly signalled the path that the Chinese nation will take in the times to come. A close look at the ceremony, portraying a veil of utopia, showed the progress that China has made since its independence in 1949 under the guidance of the CCP, particularly after its opening up to the world. One cannot help but wonder about the future of China amidst a hostile climate when domestic nationalism and the party's grip on the nation are culminating.
The party that has withstood the test of the times, fighting the disaster like a great leap forward and cultural revolution to defenestrating the socialist ideology in the economic sphere when it found its need, has become omnipresent today. As CCP celebrated its centenary, it has also become the longest-running state party. The party which was started by just 12 men in 1921 now stands with a huge strength of 95 million members, a century later. It has not only grown in strength but also in its capacity to deliver and act with sophistication.
From Mao to Xi: the transformation of leadership and China
Mao was the driving force of the country in the initial years. His vision was to make China a socialist country that would be self-sufficient and isolated from the world. His foreign policy was short-sighted and his major vision was to command the domestic conditions of the country. The devils of 'Great Leap Forward' and 'Cultural Revolution' which killed millions of people in China still haunts the conscience of the leader of the CCP. By the time Mao left, China was the 'Sick man of Asia'.
After the death of Mao, China got a visionary leader Deng Xiaoping, whose idea was to develop China even if that warrants defenestration of the economic thinking of a Marxist-Leninist state. He was drawing lessons from the failed economy of the Soviet Union and understood well the importance of opening up and the power of Capitalism. China did open up, albeit in a hybrid sense whereby the party oversaw the development process and try to set up its domestic giants(State-owned enterprises). He also brought governance reforms by separating governance and party affairs, to make swift and effective implementation of the policies that were needed for double-digit growth. The subsequent years brought wealth and its attached powers to China.
Deng Xiaoping's successors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao followed the footstep of Deng and try to open up China further. However, the party found out that it has been risking its political-ideological belief and supremacy by opening up and developing China with liberal economic policies and decentralization of power with collective leadership, an idea opined by Deng Xiaoping, which made China the centre of the Asian century. The first breakthrough came in the aftermath of the Tiananmen incident when Deng and Party elders resolved to close down space for political reform although pursuing the economic reforms. The tides turned in the backdrop of the 2008 Beijing Olympic games, during Hu's era, as the trade-offs and ripple effects of liberal principles in the economic domain became palpable on the political domain. Under Xi, China has become more assertive over its political reforms and economic policies.
Xi was the man who came at the helm to salvage the morally decaying Chinese society and the Party. His emphasis on curbing the 'corruption and bureaucratism' was something that made him a popular leader. Now here was the man, a messiah may be, who was ready to take the bull by its horns and become the guiding force of the party as well as the citizenry.
A nationalist China under Xi Jinping
Xi is a visionary leader like Deng, albeit in a very different sense. While Deng used to follow the philosophy of 'lying low' and "Hide your strength. Bide your time", Xi was open to the idea of the inevitable rise of China. Xi is more of an amalgam of Deng and Mao, open in terms of the vision of China but closed in terms of demeanour and leadership style. With Xi at the helm, the 'century of humiliation' and China's decline under imperialism have become catchphrases in China. Extreme nationalism (or Jingoism) has become China's go-to idea. Xi is the man who came at the helm to salvage the morally decaying Chinese society and the Party. His emphasis on curbing the 'corruption and bureaucratism' is something that made him a popular leader. Now here is the man, venerated like messiah, who is ready to take the bull by its horns and become the guiding force of the party as well as the citizenry.
Xi Jinping and the party machinery's continuous harking back onto the idea of 'continuous struggle', ' continuous hard work' and 'following the core' are pushing China on the course of 'Cultural Revolution 2.0', as Mao once did to show his supremacy and compelled everyone to conform to his idea, that might turn disastrous in the future.
However, as China's domestic politics has taken a nationalistic turn, led by CCP's wolf-warriors, the idea of China's firm stand on its "internal matters" and abhorring what Xi described as "Sanctimonious preaching", during his Centenary speech, has provided an impetus to CCP's actions against what it perceives as the challenge to the party. The biggest weapons in the arsenal of the CCP to change the narrative Inside and outside its country was to use propaganda machinery and the united front works department (UFWD), respectively. In 2017, China brought the National Intelligence law to court its private firms to move in unison with the party and follow its guidelines. China's recent moves to rein in on those private firms that try to undermine the decree of the CCP (Alipay and Didi are some cases in point) has opened lacunae where the Chinese domestic politics is, increasingly, becoming harsh on any institution going against the diktats of the party or try to question the legitimacy of state institutions. Also, the historical study sessions, started by the CCP to educate people about the history of the party and its struggle, pushes the country on a path of wrong historical narratives inflated by disinformation campaigns orchestrated by state machinery that may lead to extreme politicization on matters that may warrant a rational thinking and a moderate standing. Today, the CCP values the redness in the genes, an analogy for reverence to the CCP, above everything else. Xi Jinping and the party machinery's continuous harking back onto the idea of 'continuous struggle and hard work ', 'building an ideologically moral party under the guidance of comrade Xi' and 'following the core' are pushing China on the course of 'Cultural Revolution 2.0', as Mao once tried to show his supremacy to weed out persons who, in his understanding, might pose challenges to his authority and compelled everyone to conform to his ideas, that might turn disastrous in the future.
The most intriguing part of the centenary function was Xi Jinping's speech. The speech was more comprehensive than one could have ever asked for, covering every possible domain concerning the nation (read Party). Xi's speech is the perfect example of the course that China is treading presently. Xi proudly declared of achieving its first centenary goal of making China a 'moderately prosperous society' (called 'Xiaokang' in Chinese). In his speech, he described the painstaking struggle of the CCP in building and transforming China, a country that was once mired by power struggles and revolutions to a thriving and confident one. His emphasis on the importance of the CCP in materializing the dream of rejuvenation, a word he used 47 times in his speech, of the Chinese nation and aligning the party's aspirations with people's aspirations, was to establish the legitimacy of the party and garner the unflinching support from the citizens. He, during his speech, enjoined the people about the importance of following the core of the party (means following Mr Xi) to lead China to its rightful destiny in the world. Xi's assertion of upholding the "ideology of Socialism with Chinese characteristics" and "following the Chinese path to modernization" was to throw light on a model, that has been and will continue to be, most suitable for the Chinese nation.
During his address, Xi's assertion could not have been harsher when he said, "China will not let any foreign force bully, oppress, or subjugate us. Anyone who would attempt to do so will find themselves on a collision course with a great wall of steel forged by over 1.4 billion Chinese people." His candour while saying, "We are eager to learn what lessons we can from the achievements of other cultures, and welcome helpful suggestions and constructive criticism. We will not, however, accept sanctimonious speech from those who feel they have the right to lecture us", was to point a finger towards the critics of the policies of the CCP related to 'human rights conditions' in Hong Kong and Xinjiang. Xi also mentioned Hong Kong and Xinjiang, emphasizing their importance for the territorial integrity of China, as well as Taiwan, hailing for the reunification of Taiwan in a "peaceful manner" as a main national project of the CCP.
Xi, in his speech, laid down the goal for the second centenary, in 2049, to make China a strong socialist country, called global China 2049, which also include laying down the work of making a hybrid multilateral order of community with a shared future for mankind that would work on the principle of equality, peaceful existence and mutual understanding of internal affairs, instead of the present, unjust, order based on unilateralism of the US.
Challenges before the CCP
Be that as it may, China does understand the roadblocks ahead of its future goals. Xi himself, during his speech, made it clear that ensuring a strong military and thriving technological domain will be the goal of China to ward off future challenges in an uncertain international environment that may arise before the Chinese nation. China's coalition with Russia is a clear indication of this paranoia. Furthermore, China is well aware of the possible challenges that may arise should the western world remain on an anti-China course in the times to come. This has led China to turn the argument of 'Cold war 2.0' on its head and term it as a zero-sum game mentality that may not benefit anyone.
On top of this, the domestic developments, mainly the ageing population of China, has raised concerns that would the CCP be able to achieve its second centenary goal. Furthermore, the crackdown on private technology firms has raised the issue that would China be able to achieve supremacy in the information age when it is trying to do the opposite domestically that would suppress the free environment important for these firms to thrive.
This idea (China's inevitable rise) has many takers in China which indicate that as far as the domestic romanticization with this idea continues, the course, on which China presently is, will continue, albeit with a few moderations in between to not antagonize others to take extreme measures.
The biggest questions that warrant scrutiny, at the present point, are, how far China is prepared to go onto this path and how will it try to shape the world order? The sense that China is now ready to take on the world (read the West) is omnipresent and heightened by the nationalistic undertones of the CCP. Even in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis when the west was recalcitrant and abandoned to lead the world in the post-financial crisis era, China's sense of importance on its domestic system became inflated and a sense of moral superiority took a semblance. This idea (of China's inevitable rise) has many takers in China which indicate that as far as the domestic romanticization with this idea continues, the course, on which China presently is, will continue, albeit with a few moderations in between to not antagonize others to take extreme measures. This would undermine confidence in the international environment about China and its ambitions. The recent COVID-19 'lab-leak theory' and China's subsequent opacity of the matter has raised further concerns about the internal working mechanisms of China. As far as the question of world order is concerned, China itself does not want to change the present order of which it is the biggest beneficiary (China's continuous insistence on maintaining the multilateral and globalized world order under the leadership of the UN order shows this) until it becomes irksome for China to continue in the present conditions. The CCP is more worried, not less, about the growing closeness and anti-globalization fervour in the world which may hinder the growth of the Chinese economy when it is needed the most, mainly to reach above the US's economy, feed the Chinese nationalism and establish the legitimacy of the party.
The CCP, which has enjoyed 100 years of rule without any challenge, is mindful of all the challenges before its authority that may arise in the future. It knows that it does not presently enjoy the comparative advantage that it used to enjoy once and the slow growth in the economy, due to COVID-19, coupled with the lurking challenge of getting engaged into a middle-income trap, an ageing population and a hostile external environment, all are going against the vision of a rising China. This will make the CCP more resolute in its struggle for national rejuvenation as it will continue to invoke the idea of a 'century of humiliation' and nationalism to legitimize its actions. However, the party (CCP) is missing forest for the woods and it will become clear to the party, sooner than later, that no one has risen to the top by nurturing continuous animosity and remaining in a silo, and no one will, ever, be able to do so in the future.
