When Samuel P. Huntington propounded the theory of “Clash of Civilizations” in 1996 he was beyond any doubt that post-cold war battles would be fought between cultures and societies, least he would have anticipated was that the 21st century will change this narrative where the self-interest of leaders prevails and usurp the ideological and cultural battles. The India-China border is one of the many examples of how the self-interest of leaders can overrule other matters. The two Asian giants are currently in a very strained phase of their bilateral relations with the possibility of long-haul in resolving the matters and are vying to make the other agree to the status-quo based on their perceptions. India, which wants to restore the status quo ante of April is being confronted with China, which on the other hand wants to persist on the current positions and nibble away the territory by pressurizing India.
Whilst, situations in the Himalayan region have changed considerably, the same has happened in the policy rooms of New Delhi. Indian foreign policy has undergone a subtle but much-needed shift marking it as a complete overhaul, for countering the current tumultuousness. Two current trends have emerged to the fore in recent times which signifies this shift.
The increasing salience of Neighborhood first policy
India's neighbourhood first policy was first lamented by PM Narendra Modi after assuming office in 2014. Invitees to his sworn-in ceremony were the leaders of SAARC countries, which showed the strategic necessity of India to work in the neighbourhood. It started with much enthusiasm in the initial years but lost its fervour with time. Long-agreed investment projects and bilateral agreements became just a piece of paper instead of the work on the ground. As the political situation of the neighbouring countries changed with time, so does their perceptions. The emergence of Beijing's cheque-book diplomacy coupled with New Delhi’s lax response to the growing needs of its neighbours provided an alternative of New Delhi to these countries and accentuates this process further. However, things have changed now.
As the Pandemic engulfed the region, India became the first country to gauge the momentum and extend its hands for helping the countries by exporting important medicines and essential goods, establishing its presence as a credible actor on the world stage.
India's recent personal interaction through EAM Dr S. Jaishankar in the sixth round of the India-Bangladesh foreign minister's consultative meeting gives a hint of New Delhi's growing outreach to Dhaka at a time of growing bonhomie of the latter with Beijing. The time for the meet seems to be perfect with India and Bangladesh both celebrating a golden jubilee of the liberation war of Bangladesh. When Indian foreign secretary Harsh V. Shringla and COAS Gen. MM Naravane visited Myanmar, the move is construed to improve bilateral relations. New Delhi understands the salience of Naypyidaw at a time when the Naga-peace deal is on the verge of collapsing and is trying to do its best for getting assurances from Naypyidaw given that it is not just a strategic ally of New Delhi due to its geography but the very state which can guarantee peace in the N-E states of India.
Nepal, which criticized India for its hold on the disputed territories, is now being assuaged as a virtual meeting was held between the Indian Ambassador to Nepal Vinay Mohan Kwatra and Nepal's foreign secretary Shankar Das Bairagi, to discuss the matter of disputed territories. And the visit of Indian COAS Gen MM Narvane to Nepal also hints toward New Delhi’s continuous play of balancing the act. Extension of $400 million currency swap facility to Colombo coupled with exports of important medicines to fight the Pandemic and an $18 million line of credit facility to the Maldives for the extension of fishing infrastructure, the recent $500 million assistance for developing a 6.7 km sea bridge connecting Male and Thilafushi, with a post-bridge $250 million budget-support and $800 million airport expansion, are some of the examples of growing emphasis of neighbouring counties in the statecraft of New Delhi.
When AEM Dr S. Jaishankar addressed the intra-Afghan peace process, virtually, and reiterated India's stance on the Afghan-led, Afghan-owned, Afghan-controlled peace process, he was hinting at India's long-held position. But what went unaddressed was India's urge to address a summit wherein the Taliban is a legitimate actor. Reading between the lines, the growing footprints of Islamabad and Beijing in the Afghan process gave an impetus to this process, wherein India is drawing a roadmap and changing its policy towards engaging with a non-state actor I.e. the Taliban.
Equally important is to look at countries like Seychelles and Mauritius, where Indian assistance through "Mission Sagar" helped to foster deep relations. And New Delhi's outreach to Thimphu and assurances of a continuous flow of medical and essential goods in times of need marks the way India has handled its historical ties with Bhutan.
The resurrection of the Quad
The idea of Quad first came emerged in the year 2004 with the onset of a Tsunami in the S-E and
S-Asian countries and a huge cry for humanitarian support, which was jointly provided by India, Japan, The US and Australia. The capabilities of India, however, were a shock to many, and thus started a quest to form a mini-lateral grouping for securing the disaster management capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region.
When Shinzo Abe visited New Delhi on his first bilateral visit, his speech on the 'Confluence of two seas' in the Indian Parliament- taking the cue from the book "Confluence of Two Seas" of Dara Sikoh, a Mughal prince - wherein he pointed out the growing influence of the Asian region and the connection between Indian and the Pacific Ocean in terms of connectivity, sharing of goods, the flow of capital, knowledge, ideas and people. His speech drew a line in the sand when he pointed out the need for joining forces by like-minded countries to secure the future of the region.
Perhaps the initial years of Quad passed in apprehensiveness and ambivalence of its member states who did not want to rattle China at that moment, soon with growing Chinese hedging, what started as an ambiguous idea of a HADR (Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief) coalition starts taking shape of a mini-lateral organization with a military hue. India, whilst acknowledging the need for change, struck in the cobweb of balancing the act and assuaging China’s fears. When PM Narendra Modi addressed the Shangri La Dialogue of 2018, his message of SAGAR (Security and growth for all in the region) hinted towards Beijing of New Delhi's assurance of not joining any Bandwagon led by the US. Interestingly, China has always faced dichotomy vis-a-vis Quad, where it mocked it as an informal and faceless organization on the one hand, inertly it felt apprehensive of its structure and its collusion with the geographical and strategic reach of China, on the other.
Whilst the Quad has always been construed as an arrangement to balance out China in the strategic circles of New Delhi, that thing has never been materialized. However, as a more assertive China poses challenges to the existing world order, the salience of Quad has come into question. India’s official invitation to Australia to join Malabar naval exercise has made things clear, whilst India’s willingness to sign last out of the four foundational agreements with the US, the Basic Exchange and cooperation agreement (BECA) gives more substance to this speculation. As EAM Dr S. Jaishankar attended the Quad meet held in Tokyo and for the first time used the term " a rule-based world-order" and India's outright support to it, this shows a change in attitude towards Quad and the growing pertinence of this very mini-lateral security grouping in India's foreign policy in managing China, which until now has been overlooked.
Conclusion
When Ashley Tellis said that “Sino-Indian relations can never go back to the old normal. They will reset with greater competitiveness and in ways that neither country had intended at the beginning of the crisis.”, he was referring to how a small nudge can escalate the differences that will be irreparable. Until now India has tried to balance out multiple fronts at the same time, but now the situation has changed, with the growing emphasis on neighbourhood and institutionalization of the Quad. Bandwagoning will be a possible word in the Indian foreign policy and this compelling force got a boost with a belligerent China along the LAC. As India became cognizant of the looming China challenge, the lack of hard-power and economic power has compelled India to turn towards a soft-power approach. This has culminated in India's old approach of apprehensive diplomacy- by defining strategic autonomy and non-alignment- to more proactive diplomacy of self-interest and threat perception, which is now realigning New Delhi’s choices with the facts on the ground.
Whilst the situations on the ground aren't clear yet, one thing which becomes clear is that the year 2020 marks an important change in the contours of Indian diplomacy vis-a-vis China in the right direction and possibly at a right time.
